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Abstract
The paper presents the concept of an “imitation equilibrium” and explores it in the context of some simple oligopoly
models. The concept applies to normal form games enriched by a “reference structure” specifying a “reference
group” for every player. The reference group is a set of other players, whom the player may consider to imitate.
Some of these players may not be suitable for imitation for various reasons. Only one of the most successful of the
remaining members of the reference group is imitated. Imitation is the adoption of the imitated player’s strategy.
Imitation equilibrium does not only mean absence of imitation opportunities but also stability against exploratory
deviations of “success leaders”, i. e. players most successful in their reference groups. Exploration declenches a
process of imitation which either leads back to imitation equilibrium directly or by a “return path“ after an
unsuccessful deviation.
The imitation equilibrium concept is motivated by the experimental literature which suggests that under appropriate
conditions imitation of the most successful relevant other is an important behavioral force. The concept may be
useful for the evaluation of experimental data and for the planning of future experiments.
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1. Introduction
Cournot’s oligopoly theory (1838) predicts convergence to the Cournot equilibrium in repeated
play of his quantity variation model. He envisions a dynamic adjustment process driven by short
run profit maximization against the expectation of unchanging competitors’ quantities. The idea
of convergence to Cournot equilibrium finds some support in the older literature on oligopoly
experiments (Sauermann and Selten 1959, Stern 1967).
Deviations went in the direction of cooperative quantity restraint. Especially symmetric duopoly
with common knowledge of demand and costs was conducive to joint profit maximization
(Fouraker and Siegel 1963). The availability of verbal communication possibilities is another
factor which enhances cooperation (Friedman 1972, Selten and Berg 1970). A tendency towards
Cournot equilibrium arose under conditions without communication, with asymmetric costs and
with little information about competitors’ profits.
Surprisingly new oligopoly experiments with the quantity variation model show average
quantities higher than those in Cournot equilibrium (Huck, Normann and Oechssler 1999).
Imitation of the more successful, i. e. of other players with higher profits, is offered as an
explanation. In symmetric Cournot oligopoly with constant average costs those who supply more
have higher profits as long as price is above average costs. In this situation imitation of the more
successful can be expected to result in a tendency towards competitive equilibrium. This has
been pointed out in the economic literature on evolutionary game theory (Weibull 1995, Vega-
Redondo 1999).
In the old experiments subjects usually were supplied with profit tables which made it easy to
determine best replies. Obviously this facilitates short run profit maximization against the
expected joint supply of the competitors. In the experiments by Huck, Normann and Oechssler,
subjects did not have access to easy means of finding best replies, but they received feedback on
the competitors’ profits. Therefore their experimental situation may be more conducive to
imitation of the more successful.
The older literature conveyed the impression that symmetry, communication possibilities and
information are crucial influences on behavior in oligopoly situations. It seems to be necessary to
add the information processing background as a fourth factor to this list. By this we mean tools
like profit tables without which the available information cannot be easily exploited.
The oligopoly experiments mentioned up to now are based on simple models with only one
action parameter. Experiments on more complex oligopoly situations can also be found in the
older literature. A study of this kind (Todt 1970, 1972, 1975) presents experimental evidence for
imitation of the more successful as an important feature of observed behavior. The oligopoly
situation explored by Horst Todt involved two resort towns with three hotels in each of them.
The hotels could choose between two categories (upper and lower quality), and they had to
determine capacity, price and advertising. The oligopoly situation had the character of a complex
dynamic game.3
Todt’s subjects did not indiscriminately imitate other more successful players, but only those
who were most similar to themselves. These “nearest relatives” were hotels in the same category
and, if possible, in the same resort. (A hotel which is the only one in its category has no nearest
relatives.) The behavioral tendency observed by Todt is not just imitation of the more successful,
but rather “imitation of the similar more successful”.
In the interpretation of his results, Horst Todt combined his description of imitative behavior
with an idea of local exploration. He proposed that players who are at least as successful as
similar others may make small random changes of their action parameters, presumably in order
to explore the possibilities for payoff improvement. However, he did not indicate how a player
would evaluate the success of such exploratory behavior and how a player would respond to
exploratory success or failure.
The work of Horst Todt is of special significance for this paper. Our concept of “imitation
equilibrium” grew out of an attempt to capture the essence of his ideas on imitation of the more
successful and exploratory local deviations by a formal behavioral equilibrium notion. A first
definition was proposed in a reappraisal of Todt’s work motivated by the occasion of his 70
th
birthday (Ostmann, Selten and Tietz 2000). The definitions presented here are a little different
and more suitable for application, but the essential features remain unchanged.
It is necessary to distinguish between local and global imitation equilibria. The words “local”
and “global” refer to the sets of exploratory deviations taken into account. Global imitation
equilibrium requires stability against any exploratory deviation whereas the stability of local
imitation equilibrium is restricted to sufficiently small exploratory deviations.
Our definitions apply to normal form games complemented by a “reference structure” which
assigns a set of other players to each player. This set is called the “reference group” of the player
under consideration. The players in the reference group are those who are sufficiently similar to
be imitated if they are more successful. The reference structure is thought of as exogenously
given. No attempt will be made to discuss the question how reference groups arise.
We speak of a “universal reference structure” if the reference set of a player is always the set of
all other players. In many cases a non-universal reference structure suggests itself. Thus we may
for example look at a market involving producers and spatially dispersed retailers. The reference
group of a producer may be modeled as the set of all other producers and the reference group of
a retailer may be the set of all neighboring retailers.
The imitation equilibrium concept will be applied to several oligopoly models. As we will see,
the symmetric Cournot model with constant average costs complemented by the universal
reference structure has a uniquely determined local imitation equilibrium. At this equilibrium all
players supply the same amount and price equals average costs, as in the competitive
equilibrium.
The second example to be explored is the asymmetric Cournot duopoly with unequal constant
average costs, again complemented by the universal reference structure. In this case we also find4
a uniquely determined local imitation equilibrium. In this equilibrium both players supply the
same amount, half of the monopoly supply of the low cost supplier if he were alone in the
market. Here imitation of the more successful does not drive the price down to the competitive
price. On the contrary, imitation combined with exploration moves the price up to a quasi-
monopoly level.
Unlike in the case of the symmetric oligopoly the uniquely determined local imitation
equilibrium of the asymmetric duopoly fails to be a global imitation equilibrium in a part of the
parameter space where cost differences are relatively small.
The third oligopoly situation explored is mill price competition on a circle. The players are n
firms located equidistantly on a circle. Each firm sets a mill price. Transport costs are carried by
the customers who buy where it is cheapest including transport costs. The demand of an
individual customer is completely inelastic below an upper limit for price plus transport costs,
but zero above this limit. Customers are evenly distributed on the circle. Up to unimportant
minor variations this is a standard model of location theory (Beckmann 1968). In the literature
the model is usually not presented as a fully specified normal form game. We prove that this
game has a uniquely determined pure equilibrium, referred to as the Cournot equilibrium of the
model.
The reference group of a player is formed by its left and right neighbor. Attention is restricted to
symmetric imitation equilibria at which all firms take the same price. For  2 n =  and  3 n =  there
are uniquely determined local symmetric imitation equilibria and for  3 n >  there is a whole range
of such equilibria. It turns out that for all n the local symmetric imitation equilibria are also
global ones. Interestingly, competition at imitation equilibrium is more intense than at Cournot
equilibrium for  2 n =  and  3 n = , but not necessarily for  3 n > , where the Cournot equilibrium is
also an imitation equilibrium.
2. The concept of imitation equilibrium
2.1 Imitation models
As has been explained in the introduction the concept of a local or global imitation equilibrium
refers to a normal form game complemented by a reference structure. Such a pair will be called
an “imitation model”. We restrict our attention to normal form games in which strategies can be




1)  An n-player normal form game  1 (,...,;) n GSSH =  where Si is player i’s strategy set and H is
the payoff function which assigns the payoff vector5
( ) 1 ()(),...,() n HsHsHs =
to every strategy combination  1 (,...,) n sss =  with  ii sS ˛  for i = 1, ..., n. The set of all strategy
combinations is denoted by S. For i = 1, ..., n the strategy set Si is a non-empty convex subset
of a Euclidean space. An element  ii sS ˛  is a strategy of player i. For  sS ˛  and i = 1, ..., n
player i’s payoff Hi (s) for s is a real number.
2)  A reference structure R which assigns a subset R(i) of the player set N  = {1, ..., n} to every
iN ˛ , such that i does not belong to R(i). The set R(i) is called player i’s reference group.
The case that R(i) is empty is not excluded.
Comment: Since we do not make use of mixed strategies, the word “strategy” always refers to a
pure strategy. This is reflected by the above definition.
We will refer to a player by the pronoun “it”. This seems to be justified, since we look at players
as organizations rather than individuals. Firms are neither male nor female.
Experimental games often have discrete strategy sets. Thus in a Cournot oligopoly supplies may
be restricted to integer multiples of a smallest money unit. Here we will not discuss the question
how our concepts could be adjusted to such cases, even if this problem may need to be addressed
in the evaluation of experiments. The restriction of our attention to continuously varying
strategies permits us to concentrate on essential features of conceptual issues and theoretical
results.
2.2 Informal conceptual preview
In the following we will informally explain some concepts. More precise definitions will be
given later.
In this paper imitation is understood as a change of strategy, a replacement of one’s current
strategy by the strategy of a more successful member of the reference group. Obviously nobody
can be imitated who uses the same strategy. A player together with those members of its
reference group using the same strategy as it does form the group of “costrategists” of this
player. Other members of the reference group of the player may be “incomparable” in the sense
that they play strategies not in the player’s strategy set. The remaining members of the reference
group and the player itself are “comparable”. Obviously it makes no sense to imitate a
comparable player unless its payoff surpasses that of all costrategists. Among these players (if
there are any) only those with the highest payoff are “success examples” of the player. It is
assumed that only success examples are imitated. The strategy of a success example is an
“imitation opportunity”.
Two success examples may achieve the same payoff with different strategies. Therefore it cannot
be excluded that a player has more then one imitation opportunity. Our definitions must take this
into account, even if the possibility may rarely arise in particular cases.6
The concept of imitation equilibrium is based on the idea that imitation goes on as long as there
are players with imitation opportunities. It is assumed that at a strategy combination at which this
is the case, all these players immediately imitate a success example. A new strategy combination
is reached in this way and new imitation opportunities may present themselves there. In this way
an “imitation process” takes its course which goes on until a strategy combination without
imitation opportunities is reached.
We think of the imitation process as a journey through the space of strategy combinations.
Inspired by this image we refer to strategy combinations with imitation possibilities as “way
stations” and to strategy combinations without imitation opportunities as “destinations”.
At a way station each player with imitation possibilities immediately takes one of them. They all
act simultaneously. A new strategy combination to which the imitation process can move in this
way is called a “successor station” of the way station under consideration. Since a player may
have several imitation opportunities, a way station may have several successor stations. An
“imitation path” is a string of strategy combinations, such that each way station on the string is
followed by one of its successors. A finite imitation path ends with a destination, but the
possibility of an infinite imitation path is not excluded. Such a path would proceed from way
station to way station and never reach a destination.
In his theory of economic development, Schumpeter (1939) portrays business cycles as driven by
innovation and imitation. Innovation only occurs when imitation has run its course. Similarly the
concept of imitation equilibrium is based on the assumption that exploration does not happen as
long as the imitation process is going on. Imitation responses are thought of as quick and
exploration will be considered only after things have settled down and a destination has been
reached.
Following Horst Todt (1970, 1972, 1975) it is also assumed that exploration activities are
restricted to those who are “success leaders” with respect to their reference group, in the sense
that the player’s profit is at least as high as he highest in its reference group.
An imitation equilibrium must be a destination, but this is not enough. Additional stability
properties are required. A global imitation equilibrium must be stable against any exploratory
deviation of a success leader and a local one only against sufficiently small ones.
It will now be explained what stability against an exploratory deviation means. Consider a
strategy combination which is a candidate for imitation equilibrium and a deviation of a success
leader from it. The deviation leads from the candidate to a new strategy combination, referred to
as the “deviation start”. In order to examine whether the candidate is stable or not we have to
look at all imitation paths beginning with the deviation start. We call these paths the “deviation
paths”. A first stability requirement is that no deviation path is infinite. Assume that this is the
case. Then each deviation path ends with a destination to which we refer as the “deviation
destination” of this path.7
We speak of a deviation path “without deviator involvement” if at the way stations on the path
the deviator never has an imitation opportunity. On a deviation path “with deviator involvement”
the deviator takes an imitation opportunity at least once.
The concept of an imitation equilibrium is based on the idea that under appropriate
circumstances a deviation will be abolished in favor of a return to the old strategy. In the case of
a deviation path with deviator involvement the deviation is abolished in favor of an imitation
opportunity, and as we see it, the question of a return to the old strategy does not arise any more
after this has happened. We may say that imitation supercedes exploration. Therefore a second
stability requirement is that the destination reached by a deviation path with deviator
involvement must be the imitation equilibrium.
Imagine that a destination has been reached on a deviation path without deviator involvement.
Suppose that at this destination the deviator’s payoff is at least as high as at the imitation
equilibrium candidate. Then the deviator is not dissatisfied with the results of its exploratory
deviation. It is assumed that in this situation the deviator sticks to its deviation. This has the
consequence that the imitation equilibrium candidate is not reached again. Therefore a third
stability requirement is that at every destination reached by a deviation path without deviator
involvement the deviator’s payoff is lower than at the imitation equilibrium.
Now suppose that at the end of a deviation path without deviator involvement a destination is
reached at which the deviator’s payoff is lower than at the imitation equilibrium candidate. It is
assumed that in this situation the deviator is dissatisfied with the result of its exploratory
deviation and therefore returns to its old strategy in the hope to get its old payoff back. Thereby
the destination is changed to a new strategy combination which we call a “return start”. If we
speak of a “return start” we mean a strategy combination arising in this way from a destination of
a deviation path without deviator involvement and with lower payoffs at the destination than at
the imitation equilibrium candidate. At a return start the imitation process is set in motion again.
An imitation path beginning with a return start is called a “return path”. A fourth stability
requirement is that every return path is finite and reaches the imitation equilibrium as its
destination.
The four stability requirements together define stability of an imitation equilibrium with respect
to a given deviation. They may be looked upon as conditions on a dynamic process declenched
by the deviation. This process generates a sequence of strategy combinations which, however, is
not uniquely determined in general. In this sense the process is indeterminate. Figure 1
schematically represents the possibilities which can arise in the case of stability. In this case the
process must come back to the imitation equilibrium eventually, either directly by a deviation
path or indirectly at the end of a return path.8
1) Only deviations of success leaders are considered.
2) The deviator’s payoff at the destination must be lower than at the imitation equilibrium.
3) The deviator returns to his old strategy in the imitation equilibrium.
Figure 1: Schematic representation of the possibilities for the dynamic process declenched by a deviation in the
case of stability
In order to provide a better overview we now repeat the four stability requirements with
convenient names attached to them:
1.  Finiteness requirement: No deviation path is infinite.
2.  Involvement requirement: The destination reached by a deviation path with deviator
involvement must be the imitation equilibrium.
3.  Payoff requirement: At every destination reached by a deviation path without deviator
involvement the deviator’s payoff is lower than at the imitation equilibrium.
4.  Return requirement: Every return path is finite and reaches the imitation equilibrium as its
destination.
An imitation equilibrium must be a destination. This is one of the defining properties of both
global and local imitation equilibrium. A global imitation equilibrium is a destination which
satisfies the four stability requirements for all possible deviations of success leaders. In the case
of a local imitation equilibrium the four requirements are not imposed on all these deviations but


















2.3 Definitions and notation
All definitions refer to a fixed but arbitrary imitation model M = (G,R) as described in 2.1. The
extended reference group  () Ri of player i is the union of  () Ri and i. For every strategy
combination  1 (,...,) n sss =  we distinguish three types of members of the extended reference
group. The costrategists of i are all players  () kRi ˛  with  ki ss = . The players comparable to i
are all players  () kRi ˛  with  ki sS ˛ . Players in  () Ri which are neither costrategists of nor
comparable to i are called incomparable to i. The set of all costrategists of i at s is denoted by
() i Cs and the set off all players comparable to i is denoted by  () i Rs. A success example for i at s









A strategy of a success example j is called an imitation opportunity of i at s. The set of all
imitation opportunities of i at s is denoted by Ii (s) and is referred to as the imitation opportunity
set of i at s.
A strategy combination  1 (,...,) n sss =  is called a way station if Ii (s) is non-empty for at least one
player i and a destination if Ii (s) is empty for all players i. If s is a way station, then a successor









A finite imitation path is a sequence s
 1, ... , s
 m of strategy combinations such that for j = 2, ... , m
the strategy combination s
 j is a successor station of s
 j-1 and s
 m is a destination. An infinite
imitation path is an infinite sequence s
 1, s
 2, ... of strategy combinations such that for j = 2, 3, ...
the strategy combination s
 j is a successor station of s
 j-1. An imitation path is either a finite or an
infinite imitation path. The definition does not exclude the special case of a sequence s
 1 starting
and ending with a destination.
A success leader at a strategy combination s is either a player j whose reference group R( j) is







in the case that R( j) is non-empty. Obviously a player j whose payoff at s is maximal among all
payoffs at s must be a success leader. It is also clear that the imitation opportunity set Ij (s) of a
success leader at s must be empty, since a success leader cannot have a success example.
Let  1 (,...,) n sss =  be a strategy combination and let ( j, tj) be a pair in which j is a player and tj is
one of j’s strategies. The strategy combination resulting from s by replacing its j-th component sj
by tj and leaving all other components unchanged is denoted by s/( j, tj):10
111 /(,)(,...,,,,...,). jjjjn sjtsstss -+ =
The pair ( j, tj) is a deviation from s if tj is different from sj. In this case s/( j, tj) is called the
deviation start generated by the deviation ( j, tj) from s and an imitation path beginning with s/( j,
tj) is called a deviation path generated by the deviation ( j, tj) from s.
The shorter notation s/tj instead of s/( j, tj) is often found in the game-theoretic literature.
However, in our context it is better to identify the player whose strategy is replaced, since
overlaps among strategy sets are of crucial importance.
Let s
 1, ... , s
 m or s
 1, s
 2, ... be a deviation path generated by a deviation ( j, tj) from s. We speak
of a deviation path without deviator involvement if for all s
 k on the path the j-th component is tj
and of a deviation path with deviator involvement if this is not the case for at least one s
 k on the
path.
If s
 1, ... , s
 m is a finite deviation path generated by the deviation ( j, tj) from s, then the
destination s
 m is called reached by ( j, tj) from s. We say that s
 m is reached from s with or
without deviator involvement if s
 1, ... , s
 m is a deviation path with or without deviator
involvement, respectively. The set of all destinations reached by ( j, tj) from s with deviator
involvement is denoted by Dj ( s, tj). Similarly, D-j ( s, tj) stands for the set of all destinations
reached by ( j, tj) from s without deviator involvement. D( j, tj) is the set of all destinations
reached by ( j, tj) from s. For u˛ D-j ( s, tj) the strategy combination u/( j, sj) is called the return
start after u and an imitation path generated by u/( j, sj) is called a return path after u.
We now have formally introduced all the auxiliary definitions needed for a formal restatement of
the four stability requirements loosely explained in the previous section. In the following it
should be kept in mind that only deviations of success leaders are considered, even if the
definition of stability against a deviation is more general.
A destination  1 (,...,) n sss =  is stable against the deviation ( j, tj) from s if the following four
stability requirements are satisfied:
Finiteness requirement: Every deviation path generated by the deviation ( j, tj) from s is finite.
Involvement requirement: Dj (s, tj) ˝ {s}.
Payoff requirement: Hj (u) < Hj (s) for every u ˛ D-j (s, tj).
Return requirement: For every u ˛ D-j (s, tj) the return path after u is finite and has s as its
destination.
A strategy combination  1 (,...,) n sss =  is a global imitation equilibrium if it is a destination which
for every success leader j at s is stable against all deviations ( j, tj) from s.
A strategy combination  1 (,...,) n sss =  is a local imitation equilibrium if it is a destination and if a
positive number  0 e >  exists such that for every success leader j at s the destination s is stable11
against all deviations ( j, tj) with |tj – sj|  e < , where |tj – sj|  denotes the Euclidean distance
between sj and tj.
3. Application to the symmetric linear Cournot model
3.1 The model
The symmetric Cournot oligopoly has the structure of an n-person game with the oligopolists
i = 1, ..., n as players and profits as payoffs. The strategy set Si of player i is the set of all real
numbers xi with xi ￿ 0. We will use the following symbols:
xi supply of oligopolist i,
x total supply,
p price,
c constant unit costs,
Hi profits.
















The parameters a, b and c are positive constants with
. bc >
It can be seen immediately that this profitability condition is necessary for the possibility of
positive profits.
We investigate an imitation model (G, R) which combines the Cournot oligopoly G with the
universal reference structure R. As has been explained in the introduction the universal reference
structure assigns the set of all other players to each player.
3.2  Cournot equilibrium
























- ￿￿ = ￿￿ + Łł
The derivation of these formulas is elementary and will not be presented here.
3.3 The imitation equilibrium
It will be shown that the symmetric linear Cournot oligopoly has a uniquely determined local
imitation equilibrium, namely the strategy combination
*
00 (,...,) sxx =







At this strategy combination price equals unit costs and all profits are zero. The uniquely
determined local imitation equilibrium is also a global imitation equilibrium.
Lemma 1: s
* is a global imitation equilibrium.
Proof: Obviously s
* is a destination. All players are success leaders. Assume that player j
deviates to a quantity x+ > x0. This leads to a deviation start s
*/( j, x+) with a price smaller than c.
There j’s profit is smaller than that of all other players, since j supplies more than they do and
unit profits are negative. Player j is induced to imitate one of them and the imitation path
immediately leads back to s
*.
Now assume that player j deviates to a quantity x– < x0. This leads to a price greater than c. At
the deviation start s
*/( j, x–) player j’s profit is smaller than that of the other players since j
supplies less than they do and unit profits are positive. Here, too, the deviation path immediately
leads back to s
*.
Lemma 2: s
* is the only local imitation equilibrium.
Proof: We distinguish three possible cases concerning the relationship of the price p to the unit
cost c.
(1) p > c,
(2) p < c,
(3) p = c.13
Consider a strategy combination  1 (,...,) n sxx =  with p > c or p < c. It is clear that s is a
destination if and only if all xi are equal. In this case all profits are equal and no player has any
imitation opportunities, whereas otherwise profits are unequal and at least one player has an
imitation opportunity. This is different in case (3) in which players with different quantities have
the same profit zero.
Case (1): In this case a local imitation equilibrium must have the form
(,...,) syy =

















holds. If s is a local imitation equilibrium then it must be stable against a deviation ( j, y+) with
y+ sufficiently near to y. At s/( j, y+) player j’s profit is greater than that of the other players. He
is imitated by all of them and this leads to the new destination  (,...,) syy +++ =  reached without
deviator involvement. There j earns less than at s and therefore returns to y. At the return start
s+/( j, y) player j’s profit is lower than that of the others. He imitates one of them. Thereby s+ is
reached. The return path does not end in s but in s+. Therefore s is not stable against ( j, y+).
Consequently s fails to be a local imitation equilibrium.

















holds. If s is a local imitation equilibrium then it must be stable against a deviation ( j, y-) with y–
sufficiently close to y. At s/( j, y–) player j’s profit is greater than that of all other players, since
unit profits are negative and j supplies less than the others. All other players imitate j and thereby14
the deviation path ends at  (,...,) syy --- = . There player j earns more than at s. The payoff
requirement is violated. It follows that s is not a local imitation equilibrium.
Case (3): In this case a local imitation equilibrium s different from s
* must be a strategy
combination
1 (,...,) n sxx =
with different supplies for at least two players. Let  x  be the maximal and  x be the minimal
supply in s. In view of p = c all players have the same profit zero and all of them are success
leaders. Let j be a player with  j xx = . Consider a deviation ( j, x+) with x+ > 0 from s. If s is a
local imitation equilibrium, then s must be stable against all deviations of this kind with x+
sufficiently near to  x . At s/( j, x+) the price is lower than c. Therefore the players k with  k xx =
have the highest profit there. For all other players  x is an imitation opportunity. The deviation
path leads to the new destination  (,...,) sxx =  with deviator involvement. Contrary to the
involvement requirement the destination s is not reached. Consequently s cannot be a local
imitation equilibrium.
Theorem 1: The symmetric linear Cournot oligopoly (as described in this section) combined
with the universal reference structure has a uniquely determined local imitation equilibrium s
*.
At s
* price equals average costs and each oligopolist has the same supply ()/ bcan - . Moreover
s
* is also a global imitation equilibrium.
Proof: The assertion is an immediate consequence of lemma 1 and lemma 2.
Comment: One may think that the interaction of imitation and exploration modeled in this paper
generally drives price down to the level of perfect competition. However, as we will see, this is
not the case. The result obtained in this section crucially depends on the symmetry of the
situation.
4. The linear Cournot duopoly with different costs
4.1The model
The asymmetric linear Cournot duopoly is similar to the model treated in the previous section.
There are only two competitors but their constant unit costs are different. They are c for
duopolist 1 and c + h for duopolist 2 where h is a positive constant. It is convenient to set up the
model in terms of player 1‘s unit profits g = p – c instead of price. This can be done by inserting
g + c for p in the demand equation. We then use the freedom to fix the quantity unit and the
money unit in such a way that the negative slope and the intercept become 1. With these
























xi supply of duopolist i,
x total supply,
g duopolist 1’s unit profit,
h cost difference.
The inequality 1 xc -‡-  replaces  0 p ‡ . It can be seen immediately that g – h is duopolist 2’s
unit profit. h is constrained to the interval  1
2 0 h <<, since this leads to a situation with an
internal Cournot equilibrium (see below). We assume the universal reference structure.
4.2 The Cournot equilibrium











































Obviously H1 increases and H2 decreases with h in the interval  1
2 0 h ££. The formulas are not
valid for  1
2 h > . There we have  1
1 2 x =  and  2 0 x = . It can be seen that  1
2 h <  is necessary and
sufficient for the existence of an internal Cournot equilibrium.16
4.3 Local imitation equilibrium
Lemma 3: The strategy combination ( )
11
44 ,  is a local imitation equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a strategy combination  00 (,) xx with  1
0 2 0 x ££ . Obviously  00 (,) xx is a
destination. 1’s profit at  00 (,) xx is











the function  0 () fx has a maximum at  1
0 4 x = . At ( )
11
44 ,  player 1’s profit is greater than that of
player 2. Therefore 1 is a success leader there and 2 is not. For every  0 x  sufficiently near to  1
4
we still have  ( )
1
120 4  at , HHx > . Therefore, at this strategy combination player 2 has an
imitation opportunity. The deviation path starting with  ( )
1
0 4 , x  immediately reaches  00 (,) xx
without deviator involvement. Player 1’s payoff at  00 (,) xx is lower than at( )
11
44 , , since  0 () fx
has its maximum at  1
0 4 x = . Therefore player 1, the deviator, returns to  1
1 4 x = . At ( )
1
0 4,x  player
1’s payoff is greater than that of player 2, since  0 x  is smaller than  1
4. Therefore player 2 has an
imitation opportunity at ( )
1
0 4,x  and the return path immediately leads back to ( )
11
44 , . This shows
that ( )
11
44 ,  is a local imitation equilibrium.
Comment: We want to show that ( )
11
44 ,  is the only local imitation equilibrium. Obviously every
strategy combination  00 (,) xx is a destination. However, there are other strategy combinations
with this property, namely those with  12 HH = . The following lemma serves to exclude the
possibility that one of them is a local imitation equilibrium.
Lemma 4: Let  12 (,) xx be a strategy combination with
112212 (,)(,) HxxHxx = .
Then  12 (,) xx is not a local imitation equilibrium.
We first look at the special case  0 g = . In this case we have  122 0 HHhx -==  and therefore
2 0. x =  In view of  1 gx =- and  1 xx =  this yields  1 1. x =  We now show that (1,0) is not a local
imitation equilibrium. Player 1’s payoff at (1,0) is zero. Suppose that player 1 deviates to a
supply  1 1 x >  arbitrarily near to 1. At  1 (,0) x  player 1’s payoff is negative. However, player 2 has
zero profits and therefore is a success example for player 1. 1 imitates 2 and the deviation path
reaches (0,0) with deviator involvement. This shows that (1,0) is not a local imitation
equilibrium.
Now assume  0 g „ . We first look at he special case  12 0 xx == . At the destination (0,0) both
players have zero profits. Player 1 may deviate to an arbitrarily small e. For sufficiently small e
player 1’s profit at (,0) e  is positive whereas that of player 2 is zero. Therefore player 2 imitates17
player 1 at (,0) e  and the new destination (,) ee  is reached without deviator involvement. There
both profits are positive, contrary to the payoff requirement. This shows that (0,0) is not an
imitation equilibrium.
We now assume  1 0 and 0 gx >> . Obviously  12 HH =  implies  21  and  ghxx >> . Suppose  that
player 1 deviates to a supply  1 xx + >  with  12 2xxx + <+. Arbitrarily near to  1 x  such an  x+ can be












player 1’s profit at  2 (,) xx +  is greater than that of player 2 for  x+  sufficiently near to  1 x . Player 2
imitates player 1 at this deviation start and the new destination  (,) xx ++  is reached without
deviator involvement. In view of  12 2xxx + <+ unit profits are greater than at  12 (,) xx, contrary to
the payoff requirement. It follows that  12 (,) xx is not a local imitation equilibrium.
It remains to examine the case  1 0 and 0 gx <> . Let  12 (,) xx be a strategy combination with these
properties and with  12 HH = . Obviously we must have  212 0 and  xxx >> . Suppose that player 1
deviates to an  x+ with 1 xx + > . In view of the fact that  121 () HHx ¶-¶  is negative, player 1’s
profit is lower than that of player 2 at  2 (,) xx +  if  x+  is sufficiently near to  1 x . At this deviation
start player 1 imitates player 2 and the new destination  22 (,) xx is reached with deviator
involvement. Contrary to the involvement requirement the process does not lead back to  12 (,) xx.
Therefore  12 (,) xx is not a local imitation equilibrium. This completes the proof.
Lemma 5: Let  0 0 x ‡  be a number with 1
0 4 x „ . Then the strategy combination  00 (,) xx is not a
local imitation equilibrium.
Proof: As we have seen in the proof of lemma 3 player 1’s profit  100 (,) Hxx has its maximum at
1
0 4 x = . Moreover, the derivative of  100 (,) Hxx with respect to  0 x  is positive for  1
0 4 x <  and
negative for 1
0 4 x > . In addition to this we have
1002000 (,)(,) HxxHxxhx -= .
By lemma 3 the strategy combination (0,0) is not a local imitation equilibrium, since both profits
are equal there. We can assume  0 0 x > . For  0 0 x >  player 1’s payoff is always greater than that
of player 2 in a sufficiently small neighborhood of  00 (,) xx. Therefore at  00 (,) xx player 1 may
deviate to some  1 x  between  0 x  and  1
4, but sufficiently near to  0 x . At  10 (,) xx player 1’s payoff is
higher than that of player 2 and player 2 imitates player 1. Thereby the new destination  11 (,) xx is
reached with deviator involvement. At  11 (,) xx player 1 has a higher payoff than at  00 (,) xx.
Therefore  00 (,) xx is not a local imitation equilibrium.
Theorem 2: The asymmetric linear Cournot oligopoly as described in this section has one and
only one local imitation equilibrium, namely the strategy combination  ( )
11
44 , .
Proof: A destination must either be of the form  00 (,) xx or it must have the property 12 HH = .
Therefore the theorem follows by lemmata 3, 4, and 5.18
Comment: At the uniquely determined local imitation equilibrium the price, unit costs plus unit
profits, is the same one as the monopoly price player 1 would take if player 1 were alone in the
market. The Cournot equilibrium unit profit (1)/3 h +  is smaller than  1
2 in the interval  1
2 0 c <<.
We may say that in the case of the asymmetric linear Cournot oligopoly, local imitation
equilibrium does not drive prices down to average costs like in the symmetric case, but rather up
to a quasi-monopoly level. The fact that this holds for even very small cost differences means
that there is a sharp discontinuity with respect to this parameter.
We will now turn our attention to the question under which circumstances the uniquely
determined local imitation equilibrium is also a global one. As we will see this is not generally
true. A global imitation equilibrium does not exist if the cost difference is too small. The
following theorem shows that the dividing line between existence and non-existence of global
imitation equilibrium is at the cost difference  13/4 h =- . This is approximately equal to .134.
Theorem 3: The uniquely determined local imitation equilibrium of the asymmetric linear
Cournot oligopoly as described in this section is also a global imitation equilibrium if the cost
difference parameter h satisfies the inequality
3
4 1 . h >-
Otherwise no global imitation equilibrium exists.
Proof: We first show that the local imitation equilibrium is a global one if the condition is
satisfied. Suppose player 1 deviates from  ( )
11
44 ,  to a supply  1
11 4  with  xx „ . We distinguish three
cases:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
















In case (1) player 1 imitates player 2 and thereby the local imitation equilibrium is reached again.
Obviously case (1) does not pose any difficulties. We now turn our attention to case (2). Here a
destination is reached by the deviation. We have to show that at this destination player 1 has a
lower payoff than at the local imitation equilibrium. An easy calculation shows
( ) ( )
2 3 111
211111 44164 ,, HxHxxxh -=-+- .






1111 41644 1 Hxxhx =--=-+-.
In view of  1
2 h <  this shows that  1 H  must be negative. At the local imitation equilibrium player
1’s payoff is  1
8 . Therefore player 1 returns to the local imitation equilibrium. The local imitation
equilibrium is stable against deviations of this kind.
Now consider case (3). The expression for  ( ) ( )
11
2111 44 ,, HxHx -  derived above shows that a
deviation  1
1 4 x „  fitting this case must have the property
2 3 1
11 164 0 xxh -+-< .
In this case player 2 imitates player 1. This leads to the destination  11 (,) xx. As we have seen in
the proof of lemma 3, player 1’s maximal payoff for destination  00 (,) xx is reached at  1
0 4 x = .
Therefore at  11 (,) xx player 1’s payoff is lower than at ( )
11
44 , . Therefore player 1 returns to its
strategy  1
4 in the local equilibrium. It is now important what happens at ( )
1
1 4,x . Player 2 will
imitate player 1 if we have
( ) ( )
11
1121 44 ,,0 HxHx -> .
This is equivalent to
2 3
11 16 (1)0 xhx --+>.
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Player 2 always imitates player 1 at ( )
1
1 4,x  if this value is positive. This is the case for
3
4 1 . h >-
If h satisfies the above inequality, then player 2 imitates player 1. Thereby  ( )
11
44 ,  is reached
again. It is now clear that the local imitation equilibrium is also a global one if the condition on h
is satisfied.
It remains to show that for
3
4 01 h <£-20
the local imitation equilibrium fails to be a global one. Assume that this inequality holds and








In this case we obtain









--- ￿￿ -=-+-=- ￿￿
Łł
In view of  1
2 h <  the last expression is negative. This means that at ( )
1
1 4 , x  player 1 earns more
than player 2, and player 2 imitates player 1. Again, at  11 (,) xx player 1’s payoff is lower than at
( )
11
44 , . Therefore player 1 returns to its strategy  1
4, but now we have











This means that either ( )
1
1 4,x  is a destination or player 1 imitates player 2 and  11 (,) xx is reached
with deviator involvement. In both cases the local imitation equilibrium is not reached again.
This shows that ( )
11
44 ,  is not stable against the deviation  1 (1)2 xh =- . Consequently the local
imitation equilibrium is not a global one if h is not greater than the bound 13/4 - . Since every
global equilibrium must be a local one, there cannot be any other global equilibrium. This
completes the proof.
5. Mill price competition on the circle
5.1 The model
Imagine a circular island settled only along he coast line with an insurmountable mountain in the
middle. There are n producers 1,...,n equidistantly located on a circular coastal road (2) n‡ .
The distance unit is chosen in such a way that the distance between two adjacent suppliers is 1.
All suppliers have the same unit cost c. There are constant unit transport costs t.
For the sake of simplicity demand is assumed to be completely inelastic below a maximum price
p . This willingness to pay includes transport costs. All transport costs are carried by the
customers. A customer buys as cheaply as possible including transport costs, provided this can
be done without surpassing the willingness to pay  p . Demand is evenly distributed along the
circular road.
It is convenient to set up the model in terms of unit profits instead of prices. We do not permit
prices below costs. Each supplier i chooses a unit profit  0 i g ‡ . This means that the strategy set
of a player i is the set of all non-negative numbers.21
Symbols
player 's unit profit, 1,...,.
unit costs.
road coordinate 0. For 1,..., player  is located at .
()local price (minus ).














  served by  and 1 others, 1,...,, 1,...,.
total length of the road segments in , 1 ,...,, 1,...,.
total demand of 's product, 1,...,. 











by  alone, 1,...,.





5.1.1 Local price, demand and payoff
The distance  - vi  is to be understood as the distance on the road, not necessarily as the absolute
value of  - vi  if travelling from i to v to the left is shorter. The local price is the price including
transport costs paid by a customer at location v if he or she buys anything at all. Since our model
Figure 2: The determination of local price minus c














1 2 4 5 6 3
1 x 3 y 3 x 5 y 5 x 1 y22
In the following we will simply speak of local price. The qualification “minus c” will be omitted
for the sake of brevity. We say that a player i serves v if we have
() i gvitgv +-= .
im M  is the set of all points served by i together with  1 m-  other players. It can be seen without
difficulty that  im M  is a finite collection of line segments. Let  im L  be the total length of line










Player i’s payoff is
for 1,..., iii HgLin == .
Figure 3: A special situation.
The determination of the local price and the demand for i’s product is illustrated by Figure 2.
Usually there are only finitely many points served by more than one player and their total length






























5.1.2 A condition on the maximum local price
It will be assumed that
1
3 2 gt >
holds for the maximal local price. As we will see, this condition makes  g  high enough not to
matter in equilibrium.
5.1.3 The reference structure
We will consider two reference structures, a narrow reference structure  1 R  and a wider reference
structure  2 R . For  3 n ‡  the narrow reference group  1() Ri consists of player i’s left and right
neighbor and the wider reference group  2() Ri consists of player i’s two left and two right
neighbors. For  2 n =  both reference structures collapse to the universal one. This is true also for
3 n =  and in the case of  2 R  even for  4 n =  and  5 n = . Only for  5 n >  both reference structures
are different from the universal one.
The results are the same for  1 R  and  2 R , but the proofs are slightly different.
5.1.4 Payoffs for regular and semi-regular strategy combinations
Player indices involving addition and subtraction like  1 i+  and  1 i-  are to be understood modulo
n. This means that for in =  the index  1 i+  is interpreted as 1 and for  1 i =  the index  1 i-  as n.
A strategy combination
1 (,...,) n sgg =
is called semi-regular if we have
1 for 1,..., ii ggtin + -<=
and regular if in addition to this the following is true:
()for 0 gvgvn <<£.24
The inequality defining semi-regularity has the consequence that no player serves the customers
at the location of another. If there is a region with  () gvg = , then no customer inside this region
is served by anyone.
Assume that  1 (,...,) n sgg =  is regular. In this case each player i serves a road segment of length
i x  to the right of i and another one of length  i y  to the left of i. Apart from the n points at which
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for  1,..., in = . This payoff formula holds for regular strategy combinations, but not necessarily
for other ones.25
Now suppose that  1 (,...,) n sgg =  is semi-regular, but not regular. In this case there are still no
regions of positive length served by at least two players, but there may be regions served by
nobody. It may happen that the region served by i to the right of i or to the left of i is determined
by the condition that the cost of buying at i should not be higher than  g . This means that  i x  and






















We obtain  i x  as the minimum of this value and the one determined earlier. The same is true for
i y :
( ) ( )
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As before we have
() iiii Hgxy =+
for  1,..., in = . If we apply the payoff formulas for the regular case to a semi-regular strategy
combination we may obtain a payoff that is too high, but never one that is too low. This fact will
be important later.
5.2 Cournot equilibrium
If we talk of Cournot equilibrium, we mean a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of an oligopoly
model which is a normal form game. In this sense the mill price competition oligopoly as
described above has a uniquely determined Cournot equilibrium 
*
(,...,) stt =  at which every
player i chooses i gt = . Even though this is well known in the literature (e. g. Beckmann 1968) it
may nevertheless be useful to provide a more rigorous proof. The problem is not as easy as it
may seem to be if one restricts one’s attention to regular strategy combinations.
Lemma 6: Let  1 (,...,) n sgg =  be a strategy combination which is not semi-regular. Then s is not
a Cournot equilibrium.26
Proof: It can be seen without difficulty that we must have  1 0 j L =  for at least one player j.
(Examples are players 6 in Figure 2 and players 3 and 4 in Figure 3.) Suppose that we have
0 j L = . The local price  () gj at j is at least t, since the neighbors of j have non-negative unit
profits. Therefore player j can deviate to a strategy  tt ¢<  and thereby obtain a positive payoff in
(,) sjt ¢ . Obviously s cannot be a Cournot equilibrium in this case.
Now assume  0 j L >  and  1 0 j L = . Then we have  0 jm L >  for some m with  1 m > . At the points in
the regions  jm M  with  0 jm L >  player j shares its customers with other players. Suppose that
player j deviates to a strategy  jj sse ¢ =-  where e is a small positive number. Then in  (,) j sjs ¢
all these customers will be served by j alone. This means that  j L  at  (,) j sjs ¢  is at least twice as
high as at s. Since e can be arbitrarily small it follows that player j can improve its payoff in this
way. Therefore s is not a Cournot equilibrium.
Lemma 7: Let  1 (,...,) n sgg =  be a strategy combination which is not regular. Then s is not a
Cournot equilibrium.
Proof: In view of lemma 6 we can restrict our attention to semi-regular strategy combinations.
Let s be a semi-regular one which is not regular. This means that in the formulas for  i x  and  i y  at
the end of the section on payoffs for regular and semi-regular strategy combinations the second
term after the minimum operator is equal to  i x  or  i y  in at least one case. In other words, for
some player j either  i x  or  i y  is equal to  ( ) i ggt -  since one border point of the region served
by i is determined by the maximal local price  g  rather than the competition of i’s neighbor. In
view of the semi-regularity of s we must have
( ) 1 i ggt -< .
Together with  3 gt <  this yields
2 j ggtt >-> .
We will show that a player j of this kind can improve its payoff by a small decrease of  j g  and
that therefore s cannot be a Cournot equilibrium. For this purpose we look at the left partial












It can be seen that the left partial derivative of  i x  or  i y  is at least  12 t - , the derivative of the
first term after the minimum operator. Moreover it is a consequence of the semi-regularity of s
that we have














This completes the proof of the lemma.
Theorem 4: For every  2,3,... n = the mill price competition oligopoly as described in this section
has exactly one Cournot equilibrium, namely the strategy combination 
*
(,...,) stt =  at which for
1,..., in = player i chooses  i gt = .
Proof: We first show that 
* s  is the only candidate for a Cournot equilibrium. In view of lemma 7
we can restrict our attention to regular strategy combinations. Assume that  1 (,...,) n sgg =  is
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.
At  0 j g = this derivative is positive. For all regular strategy combinations s with  0 j g >  for











at a Cournot equilibrium. These conditions form a linear equation system for the unit profit:







Obviously the matrix of the system has a dominant diagonal and therefore a non-vanishing
determinant. Therefore the system has a unique solution. It can be seen immediately that this
solution is
 for 1,..., i gtin ==.
Accordingly, 
* (,...,) stt =  is the uniquely determined Cournot equilibrium.
We now show that 
* s  is a Cournot equilibrium. Let 
1 (,) ssjt e =+  with  t e‡- be a regular
strategy combination. Then we have
( )
2
1 ()1 j Hstt
tt
ee
e ￿￿ =+-=- ￿￿
Łł28
if 
1 s  is regular. This follows by the payoff formulas for regular combinations in 5.1.4. In view of
3 gt > the combination 
1 s  is regular for  tt e -<< . However, the formula for  ( )
1
j Hs above
holds for  t e=-  and  t e=+ , too, since in both cases  ( )
1
j Hs is equal to zero. It is also zero for
t e> . Obviously  ( )
1




A strategy combination  ( ) 1,..., n ggg =  for the mill price competition oligopoly is called
symmetric  if we have
0 for 1,..., i ggin == .
A local and global imitation equilibrium is called symmetric if it has this property. In this section
we restrict our attention to symmetric imitation equilibria. The question whether other ones exist
and what they look like seems to be difficult and no attempt will be made to answer it here.
As we will see in 5.3.6, the mill price competition model has a uniquely determined symmetric
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For  3 n >  there is a whole range of symmetric local equilibria, namely
( ) 000
2
,..., with  for 4,5,...
3
t
gggtn ££=  .
The range has the imitation equilibrium unit profit as its lower border and the Cournot
equilibrium unit profit as its upper border. Surprisingly, competition is more intense than at
Cournot equilibrium for  2 n =  and  3 n = , whereas for  3 n >  this is not necessarily the case.
There are no other symmetric local imitation equilibria. As we will see in 5.3.6, all of them are
also global imitation equilibria.
5.3.2 Payoffs for regular binary strategy combinations
In the following we will often have to look at the question what happens if our player, any player
j deviates from a symmetric strategy combination  ( ) 00 ,..., sgg =  to a strategy  0 g e +  where e is29
a not necessarily very small positive or negative number. Such a deviation leads to a finite or
infinite deviation sequence entirely made up of strategy combinations in which only the
strategies  0 g  and  0 g e +  occur, since starting from such a combination, no new strategy can
come in by imitation. We call such combinations binary. It is useful to get an overview over
payoffs of binary strategy combinations. We will assume that all strategy combinations
considered are regular.
Obviously the payoff of a player i at a regular strategy combination depends on the strategies of
1 i- , i, and  1 i+  only. Let  ( ) 1,..., n sgg =  be a regular binary strategy combination with  0 i gg =
or  0 i gge =+  for  1,..., in = . We introduce the following notation:
( ) 0, k Age  is the payoff of a player i at s who plays  0 g  and has exactly k neighbors who play
0 g e +  at s. The payoff  ( ) 0, k Age  is defined for  0,1,2,... k =  .
( ) 0, m Bg e  is the payoff of a player i at s who plays  0 g e +  and has exactly m neighbors who play
0 g e +  at s. The payoff  ( ) 0, m Bg e  is defined for  0,1,2,... m =  .
In view of the formula for payoffs at regular strategy combinations derived in 5.1 we have
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for  0,1,2,... k = and
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for  0,1,2,... m =  . The expressions for  k A  and  m B  can be rewritten as follows:






















It will often be necessary to look at payoff differences between neighbors playing different
strategies. Therefore we introduce the following definition:
000 (,)(,)(,) mkmk DgBgAg eee =-
for  0,1,2,... k = and  0,1,2,... m =  . Obviously  mk D  can be explicitly expressed as follows:















5.3.3 Payoffs for deviation starts
Let  ( ) 00 ,..., sgg =  be a symmetric strategy combination with  0 0 gt ££  and let
( )
1
0 , ssjg e =+
with  0 g e‡-  be the deviation start after a deviation of j to  0 g e + . We will look at the payoffs of
all players at 
1 s . It is necessary to distinguish the cases  2, 3, and 3 nnn ==> . Consider the case
2 n = . Here player j is a “double neighbor” of the other player i with  ij „ , i. e. we have
11 jji -=+=. Therefore we have
( ) ( )
















1 s  is regular. It can be seen immediately that in view of  3 gt >  these formulas hold also for
t e= . There player j receives zero. Nothing happens if player j increases e from t to a value
above t. Payoffs for  t e>  are the same as for  t e= . Negative e lead to regular deviation starts
1 s  for  o gt <  or  t e>- . In this case both payoffs are zero. These are also the values of  0 B  and
2 A  for  0 gt =  and  t e=- . Therefore the following result holds.
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with  ij „ .
Now consider the case  3 n = . Here players j and  1 j +  have only one neighbor playing  0 g e + .
Therefore we have
( ) ( )
















1 s  is regular. Everything else is similar to the case  2 n = . These formulas hold for  t e= , too,
and for  t e>  the payoffs are the same as for  t e= . At  0 gt =- and  t e=  player j receives zero
in view of  0 j g = . However, the road segment between  1 j +  and  1 j -  is still served by player
1 j + , but together with player j. The situation of  1 j -  is analogous. Each of the two receives
4 t  (see Figure 4).31
Figure 4: The situation for  j gt =  and  t e=-
Result for n = 3:
The payoffs for player j are the same as for  2 n = . The neighbors of j have the following payoffs:
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We now consider the case  3 n > . It can be seen without difficulty that here the situation for
players  1 j - , j, and  1 j +  is the same as in the case  3 n = . However, now there are other players.
These other players remain unaffected by the deviation of j, since the greatest possible deviation
of j is  t e=- .
Result for n > 3:
The payoff for j is the same as for  2 n = . The payoffs for j’s neighbors  1 j -  and  1 j +  are the
same as for  3 n = . Other players have the same payoff as at s:
( ) ( ) ( )
1
0  for  ii HsHsgiRj ==ˇ .
5.3.4 Global imitation equilibria
Lemma 8: Let  ( ) 00 ,..., sgg =  be a symmetric strategy combination. s is a global imitation
equilibrium if we have
v
 g(v)
 j  j+1  j–1  j
 j  j






















Proof: Let  ( )
1
0 , ssjg e =+ be the deviation start after a deviation of a player j. Consider the
case 2 n = . We have


















￿ ￿￿ -££ ￿￿ ￿
Łł ￿ -= ￿
￿ ￿￿ > ￿￿ ￿ Łł ￿











+ ￿￿￿￿ =-=- ￿￿￿￿
ŁłŁł
.
It is clear that therefore any deviation of player j leads to a deviation start at which j’s payoff is
smaller than that of  1 j + . It follows that j imitates  1 j +  and the deviation path immediately
comes back to s. This shows that s is a global imitation equilibrium.
Now consider the case 3 n = . Here we obtain
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The payoff difference  ( ) ( )
11
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as in the case  2 n = . This shows that  ( )
1
j Hs is smaller than  ( )
1
1 j Hs +  and  ( )
1
1 j Hs -  for every
deviation to  0 g e +  with  0 e„ . As in the case  2 n =  we can conclude that j imitates one of j’s
neighbors. Thereby s is reached again. s is a global imitation equilibrium.
In the remainder of the proof we assume  3 n > . Consider a deviation of player j to a strategy
0 g e +  with  0 e> . At 
1 s  the payoff of j may or may not be higher then j’s payoff  0 g  at s, but j’s
neighbors will always profit from an increase of j’s unit profit. Their payoffs will be greater at 
1 s
than at s. They have no reason to imitate  2 j +  or  2 j -  who still receive the same payoff  0 g  as
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For  0 23 gt ‡  and  0 e>  this is always negative. Therefore at 
1 s  player j imitates one of j’s
neighbors and thereby the deviation path immediately leads back to s.
Now consider a deviation of player j to a strategy  0 g e +  with  0 e< . Here the deviation will
decrease the payoffs of j’s neighbors and  ( ) 010 , Dg e  may be positive. However, player j cannot
be a success example for j’s neighbors unless the payoff  ( )
1
0 i Hsg =  of players i other than
1, , and 1 jjj -+  are lower than  ( )
1
j Hs. We therefore look at
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In view of  0 gt £  this is negative for  0 e< . Hence j’s payoff at 
1 s  is smaller than the payoff  0 g
of 2 j +  and  2 j - . Accordingly,  1 j +  and  1 j -  do not imitate j even if j’s payoff is higher, since
their other neighbors have a still higher payoff with the strategy  0 g . In such cases 
1 s  is a
destination. Player j then returns to j’s original strategy  0 g , since j earns less at 
1 s  than at s.
Thereby the return path immediately leads back to s. It follows that s is a global imitation
equilibrium.
5.3.5 Exclusion of other local imitation equilibria
A global imitation equilibrium always is a local one, too. We can exclude all further symmetric
local or global imitation equilibria by proving that there are no other symmetric local imitation
equilibria than those described by lemma 8. We first prove a lemma about the local properties of
the payoff differences  mk D . Then we will apply this result in order to exclude the possibility of
symmetric local imitation equilibria  ( ) 00 ,..., gg with  0 gt = . Then we will look at the cases
2, 3, and 3 nnn ==>  separately.



















































Proof: In view of  1 m£  and  0 k ‡  the denominator 2 mk -+  of the critical level  ( ) 22 tmk -+



































In view of  1 m£  in this case  ( ) 0, mk Dg e  is always negative in agreement with the lemma
regardless of whether e is positive or negative. Suppose that  0 g  is greater than the critical level.
Then  0 e  can be chosen in such a way that  00 g e -  is still greater than this level. This has the
consequence







for all e with  0 0 ee <<. Therefore in this case  ( ) 0, mk Dg e  is negative for  0 0 ee <<  and
positive for  0 0 ee <<.
Now suppose that  0 g  is smaller than the critical level. Then  0 e  can be chosen in such a way that
00 g e -  is still smaller than the critical level. This has the consequence







for all e with  0 0 ee <<. Therefore in in this case  ( ) 0, mk Dg e  is positive for  0 e>  and negative
for  0 e< . This completes the proof of the lemma.35
Lemma 10: Let  ( ) 00 ,..., sgg =  be a symmetric strategy combination with  0 gt > . Then s is not a
local imitation equilibrium.
Proof: It is necessary to distinguish the following three cases:
Case 1:  0 gg ‡ .
Case 2:  0 . 2
t
ggg >>-
Case 3:  0 2
t
ggt -‡> .
In case 1 all payoffs at s are zero and this is not changed by a deviation to  0 g e +  with  0 e> . A
new destination is reached in this way. Therefore s is not a local imitation equilibrium in case 1.
In case 2 some customers remain unserved. This is not changed by a deviation of a player j to a
strategy  0 g e -  with  0 e>  and  ( ) 0 2 ggt e ->- . At  ( )
1
0 , ssjg e =-  player j’s payoff is
higher than that of  1 j -  and  1 j + . They imitate it. Thereby the deviation path ends with a new
destination for  2 n =  and  3 n = . For  3 n >  then  1 j -  and  1 j +  are imitated by their left and right
neighbor and similar steps follow until finally the destination  ( ) 00 ,..., gg ee --  is reached.
There j’s payoff is higher than at s. Therefore s is not a local imitation equilibrium.
In case 3 the payoff formulas for regular strategy combinations apply to all binary strategy
combinations with  0 i gg =  or  0 i gge =+  for  1,..., in =  for any sufficiently small negative e.
Suppose that a player j deviates from s to  0 g e +  with  0 e< . In view of lemma 9 and  0 gt >  we
have
( ) ( ) ( )
11
100 ,0 jjk HsHsDg e + -=>
with  2 k =  for  2 n = , and  1 k =  for  2 n > . This inequality also holds with  ( )
1
1 j Hs -  instead of
( )
1
1 j Hs + . Therefore at the deviation start 
1 s  each of j’s neighbors imitates it. Thereby a
combination 
2 s  is reached. If 
2 s  is not yet the destination  ( ) 00 ,..., gg ee ++ , then there are one
or two players playing  0 g  with neighbors playing  0 g e + . In the case of two such players each of
them receives  ( ) 10 , Age  whereas the neighbor playing  0 g e +  receives  ( ) 10 , Bge . It follows by
lemma 9 that we have
( ) 110 ,0 Dg e <
since in this case the critical level is t. If  2 n >  is even, then just before the end of the deviation
path only one player playing  0 g  is left over. This player receives  ( ) 20 , Age  whereas his
neighbors receive  ( ) 10 , Bge . In view of lemma 9 and  0 gt >  we have
( ) 120 ,0 Dg e < .36
Therefore the deviation path always ends with the destination  ( ) 00 ,..., gg ee ++ . Obviously s is
not stable against such deviations. It follows that s is not a local imitation equilibrium.
Lemma 11: The global imitation equilibria described by lemma 8 are the only symmetric local
imitation equilibria for  2 n =  and  3 n = .
Proof: Let  ( ) 00 , sgg =  or  ( ) 000 ,, sggg =  be a symmetric strategy combination with  0 0 gt ££ .
It is clear that for positive or negative e of sufficiently small absolute value all binary
combinations with  0 i gg =  or  0 i gge =+  are regular. In the following we will always assume
that the absolute value  e  of e is sufficiently small in this sense and also sufficiently small in
the sense of lemma 9. In view of lemma 10 it is not necessary to look at strategy combinations
with 0 gt > . We have to distinguish four cases:



















We first look at case (i). Suppose that player 2 deviates to a strategy  0 g e +  with  0 e> . At
( )
1
00 , sgg e =+  player 2 receives  ( ) 00 , Bge  and 1 receives  ( ) 20 , Age . According to lemma 9
we have
( ) ( ) ( ) 0200020 ,,,0 DgBgAg eee =->
for  0 2 gt < . Therefore at 
1 s  player 2 receives more than player 1. Player 1 imitates player 2 and
thereby the destination  ( )
2
00 , sgg ee =++  is reached. Player 2 receives  ( ) 20 , Bge  at 
2 s  and 1
receives  ( ) 00 , Age  at 
2 s .
( ) ( ) ( ) 2002000 ,,,0 DgBgAg eee =-> .
Therefore player 2 does not return to  0 g . consequently s is not a local imitation equilibrium in
case (i).
We now look at case (ii). Suppose that player 2 deviates to  0 g e +  with  0 e< . Again player 2
receives  ( ) 00 , Bge  and 1 receives  ( ) 20 , Age . it follows by lemma 9 that  ( ) 020 , Dg e  is positive
for  0 2 gt > . Therefore at  ( )
1
00 , sgg e =+  player 1 imitates 2 and the new destination
( )
2
00 , sgg ee =++  is reached. 2’s payoff is  ( ) 20 , Bge  at 
2 s  and  ( ) 00 , Age  at s. In view of
( ) 200 , Dg ee =  we have  ( ) ( ) 2020 ,, BgAg ee < . Therefore player 2 returns to  0 g . At the return37
start  ( )
3
00 , sgg e =+  player 2 receives  ( ) 00 , Bge  and 1 receives  ( ) 20 , Age . In view of
( ) 200 ,0 Dg e >  player 2 imitates player 1. In this way the return path leads to the destination 
2 s
and not to s. It follows that in case (ii) s is not a local imitation equilibrium.
Now consider case (iii). Suppose that player 2 deviates to  0 g e +  with  0 e> . At
( )
1
0 2, ssg e =+  player 2 receives  0 B  and player 1 receives  1 A. In view of lemma 8 we have
( ) ( ) ( ) 0100010 ,,,0 DgBgAg eee =->
for 0 23 gt < . Therefore players 1 and 3 imitate player 2 at 
1 s . This leads to the destination
( )
2
000 ,, sggg eee =+++ . Player 2 receives  ( ) 20 , Bge  at 
2 s  and  ( ) 00 , Age  at s. In view of
( ) 020 , Dg ee =  we can conclude that 2 does not return to  0 g  and that therefore s is not a local
imitation equilibrium in case (iii).
Finally we look at case (iv). Suppose that player 2 deviates to 0 g e +  with  0 e< . It follows by
lemma 9 that  01 0 D >  holds. Therefore player 2 has a higher payoff than player 1 at
( )
1
0 2, ssg e =+ . Player 2’s neighbors 1 and 3 imitate 2. In view of  ( ) 020 , Dg ee =  player 2’s
payoff  ( ) 20 , Bge  at  ( )
2
000 ,, sggg eee =+++  is smaller than 2’s payoff  0 A  at  ( ) 000 ,, ggg.
Therefore 2 returns to  0 g . By lemma 9 we have  ( ) 200 ,0 Dg e >  for  0 23 gt > . Therefore 2 has a
lower payoff than 1 at the return start  ( )
3
000 ,, sggg ee =++ . Player 2 imitates 1 or 3 and
thereby the destination 
2 s is reached by the return path, and not s. In case (iv) s is not a local
imitation equilibrium, either.
Lemma 12: For  3 n >  the global equilibria described by lemma 8 are the only local imitation
equilibria.







We have to show that s is not a local imitation equilibrium. By lemma 10 we know that s is not a
local imitation equilibrium for  0 gt > . As in the proof of lemma 11 we will assume that e is
sufficiently small in the sense that the binary strategy combinations involving  0 g  and  0 g e +  are
regular and that lemma 9 can be applied.
Suppose that a player j deviates to  0 g e +  with  0 e> . Then at  ( )
1
0 , ssjg e =+  player j has the
payoff  ( ) 00 , Bge . In view of lemma 9 we have
( ) 0000 ,0 for  Dggt e >< .








This has the consequence that player j’s payoff at 
1 s  is greater than that of j’s neighbors and that
of their other neighbors  2 j -  and  2 j + . Therefore j’s neighbors imitate j and we receive a
binary strategy combination in which  1 j - , j, and  1 j +  play  0 g e +  and all other players use 0 g .
Now the payoff difference for neighbors with different strategies is
( ) 1100 ,0 for  Dggt e >< .
The imitation of neighbors playing  0 g e +  by neighbors using  0 g  goes on until no player or only







Also in this case finally the symmetric strategy combination  ( )
2
00 ,..., sgg ee =++  is reached as
the final destination of the deviation path. At 
2 s  player j receives the payoff  0 g e +  which is
higher than j’s payoff at s. Consequently j does not return to s. It is clear that s is not a local
imitation equilibrium.
5.3.6 Symmetric imitation equilibria of the mill price competition model
The following theorem presents a complete overview over all symmetric local and global
imitation equilibria of the mill price competition model.
Theorem 5: The mill price competition model as described in this section has the following























These are the only symmetric local imitation equilibria of this model.
Proof: The theorem is an immediate consequence of lemma 8 together with lemmata 10, 11, and
12.39
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